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Abstract 
By combining arguments drawn from Europeanisation research, international 
political economy and party politics, this paper analyses whether European 
economic integration affects domestic interest constellations and the power 
resources of social democratic forces in Switzerland. Whereas political economy 
arguments would assume that processes of economic internationalisation 
invariably weaken social democratic forces, we argue that they can also empower 
them. Europeanisation contributes to a reconfiguration of cleavages and a greater 
fragmentation of right-wing parties that social democrats can take advantage of by 
building coalitions and using institutional veto points. Detailed case studies of four 
decision-making processes in Switzerland show that Europeanisation does not 
coincide with a weaker position of social democrats. On the contrary, they are 
stronger in Europeanised issues because they can take advantage of increased 
conflicts within right-wing political forces, be it within political elites or between 
elites and their electoral base. 
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Introduction 
European integration has been characterised above all by a dynamic of “negative 
integration” which fosters an ever deeper integration of markets and deregulation 
whereas measures of “positive integration” that should regulate or balance the 
negative impacts of market liberalisation, and therefore be part of a social 
democratic agenda, have developed at a much slower pace at the European level 
(Scharpf 1999). Since market opening tends to favour the interests of capital over 
those of labour, processes guided by a logic of market-making should weaken 
social democratic parties and trade unions. The question then is whether 
European – predominantly “negative” – integration weakens social democratic 
forces at the domestic level. 
Despite the predominance of negative integration in the EU, the literature on 
Europeanisation has neglected its impact on domestic interest constellations (see, 
however, Héritier et al. 2001, Thatcher 2004). This is due in part to the fact that 
this body of literature has mainly focused on implementation issues, for instance in 
terms of “fit” or “misfit” between domestic and European policies rather than on 
power relationships per se (Schmidt 2008: 300). In order to analyse this impact on 
domestic power configurations, this article draws upon the literature on the 
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impact of “globalisation” or “economic internationalisation” on domestic politics 
(Garrett and Lange 1991; Milner and Keohane 1996). Economic 
internationalisation and European “negative” integration – although differing in 
their geographic reach and institutional form – can be understood as converging 
dynamics (Levi-Faur 2004) since they are deemed to lower the costs linked of 
capital mobility and thus to enhance the “exit” options of owners of this form of 
capital. This, in turn, increases their bargaining power vis-à-vis governments and 
other domestic actors, most notably labour. According to this picture, one should 
observe a weaker position of the domestic political forces advocating an increased 
regulation of markets (be it parties or trade unions) in Europeanised policy issues. 
We argue that this is not necessarily the case. While the literature on 
Europeanisation neglects its consequences on domestic actor constellations, the 
literature on globalisation and economic internationalisation downplays the role 
of domestic institutions and of potential “backlash” mechanisms to de-
nationalisation. This paper argues that a combination of the two approaches 
allows to analyse changes in the domestic power balance in a more fine-grained 
way. We argue that the domestic  strength of the Left depends both on the 
reconfiguration of domestic coalitions caused by internationalisation and on the 
characteristics of the domestic institutional architecture. Drawing upon detailed 
case studies of policy processes in Switzerland, this paper delineates the 
mechanisms that underpin the durability, or even the strengthening of the 
influence of the Left in “Europeanised” policy cases. Following a logic of control 
cases (Haverland 2006), we compare these cases with more strictly “domestic” 
cases of policy-making. The findings indicate that the strength of the Left in 
Switzerland was indeed not weaker in Europeanised cases than in control 
(“domestic”) cases. In “Europeanised” domains, the new cleavage between 
modernisation winners and losers divided the Right and allowed social democrats 
and trade unions to  impose or block policies in a way that could not be observed 
when the “Europeanisation” factor was absent.  
In the first section, we outline existing interpretations of the domestic impact of 
European integration on the power of the Left. In the second section, we propose a 
model according to which the domestic impact of economic integration is 
influenced by the cleavage structure and the role of institutions. After presenting 
the research design, case selection, and methods of data collection, we proceed to a 
systematic presentation of the empirical policy cases. We conclude with a 
synthesis of our findings and a few critical remarks. 
 
Europeanisation, economic integration and social-democratic power 
During the last decade, an important body of literature on Europeanisation – that 
is, the analysis of “the impact of European integration on domestic policies, politics 
and polities” – has emerged (e.g. Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Héritier et al. 
2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Risse 2006; Graziano and Vink 
2007). Despite this widely used encompassing definition, the bulk of that literature 
studies the impact of European integration on domestic policies. If domestic actors 
are indeed taken into account, what is emphasised is their role in promoting or 
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hindering adaptation to EU policies. The literature on Europeanisation argues at a 
general level that European integration tends to reinforce actors ”in phase” with 
European policies, but in doing so it neglects opposition and resistances to 
European integration. As a matter of fact, only few studies do analyse in depth to 
what extent European integration affects domestic power relationships and 
interest constellations. i  
In this article, social democratic forces are defined as the political forces (both 
political parties and organised interests) who advocate “moderating wage earners’ 
exposure to market risks and engineering significant income redistribution 
towards the less fortunate in society while promoting economic growth”ii 
(Kitschelt 1999: 317). By contrast, right-wing parties are defined as those parties 
who advocate freer markets, less regulation and a lowering of the tax burden. They 
are often closely linked to employers’ interests and therefore partly represent the 
interests of capital. Although the left-right positioning of parties surely varies 
across different national political constellations and has no doubt changed over 
time (see Kitschelt 1999), we adopt this minimal definition for reasons of clarity. 
According to the political economy literature, processes of economic opening are 
factors of weakening for left-wing political forces, whose social basis heavily relies 
on interests more tightly anchored in national settings than those of the Right 
(Garrett and Lange 1991; Scharpf 1999; Berger 2000). Internationalisation and 
European integration, largely characterised by increasing flows of goods, services 
and capital should alter domestic power relationships to the advantage of the 
Right through a change in the opportunity structure for capital. During post-war’s 
“embedded-liberalism” (Ruggie 1999), cross-class compromises could be seen as a 
rational solution in a context of limited capital mobility and interdependence 
between domestic actors; capital needed local labour to thrive. However, increased 
economic openness has changed this configuration by increasing the bargaining 
power of capital over labour thanks to greater “exit” options. If business can more 
easily move its assets from one country to another, its bargaining capacity over 
other domestic actors such as unions and governments increases as well. Policy 
strategies traditionally advocated by social democratic parties, such as higher 
taxation or increased social spending, become no longer viable in an environment 
where capital can flee more easily. As argued by Berger (2000: 51), “globalisation 
shrinks the state by reinforcing the political resources of those in society who 
desire limitation of the use of state powers to redress outcomes in the market”. 
Similar mechanisms can be expected with respect to European integration. The 
largest part of European integration has thus far been aimed at creating and 
extending the rules of the Single market. Market integration and deregulation in 
the domains of labour markets, utilities and others are in principle in contradiction 
with policies traditionally advocated by social democrats. It may therefore be 
argued that the strength of the Left in “Europeanised” policy sectors should be 
weaker than in policy domains where nation-states have been reluctant to 
delegate powers to the EU, such as social policies. Considering that measures of 
negative integration are mainly supported by right-wing parties, Europeanisation 
should mainly benefit them, and policy options advocated by the Left should 
become less credible. More generally, actors whose preferences are in line with 
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European decisions should be in a better position of influence in “Europeanised” 
political processes. However, we argue that the political capacity of the Left should 
be tempered by the impact of domestic veto points and by the role of new political 
cleavages generated by European integration. 
 
Europeanisation, veto power and new political coalitions 
The view according to which economic integration leads to a loss of power of Left 
forces tends to neglect the role of institutional factors as mediating mechanisms of 
empowerment. Firstly, political economy approaches predict evolutions by 
drawing upon a somewhat materialist conception of politics, where class or 
economic interests directly determine political outcomes. However, political 
competition does not happen in a vacuum, and institutions strongly structure and 
determine its outcomes, even when it comes to internationalised issues. Political 
institutions favour a specific distribution of resources and constraints that may 
temper or distort “bare” economic power relationships (Hall and Taylor 1996). As 
argued by Börzel and Risse (2003: 64), they can provide decisive resources for 
domestic actors who resist adaptation processes. It is therefore important to 
consider the institutional setting as a “filter” for international influences.  
Secondly, European integration does not only affect economic cleavages, but may 
also create new cleavages in the political sphere. As argued by Kriesi et. al (2004; 
2006), processes of de-nationalisation (globalisation, European integration) 
generate a new structural cleavage between (objective or subjective) winners and 
losers of these processes that does not align with the traditional class cleavage. In 
fact, it may even crosscut with it. In partial contradiction with the argument of the 
political economy literature, the emergence of social groups that perceive 
themselves as losers – threatened both economically and culturally – of 
internationalisation and European integration, may create new potentials for 
political mobilisation either through existing political parties or through the 
emergence of new political actors (Kriesi and Lachat 2004: 5-9). National-populist 
or eurosceptic parties appear for instance as beneficiaries of this by resorting to 
arguments against the “side effects” of globalisation and European integration such 
as immigration, unemployment or an alleged loss of political sovereignty and 
identity. Through this process, they can claim to represent the “losers” of 
globalisation processes (Kriesi and Lachat 2004: 8). Their emergence creates more 
fragmentation on the right and possibilities for new political alliances. Processes of 
“de-nationalisation” are the main issue of disagreement between national-populist 
and liberal right-wing parties. This may prompt the latter to seek compromises 
with social democrats in Europeanised issues, whereas they do not need to do so 
in “domestic” issues. Alternatively, if the new cleavage between “winners” and 
“losers” is not expressed at the level of political elites through new parties, it can 
also translate in a divide between voters and elites, the latter not being able to 
represent their preferences anymore. As suggested by Bartolini (2006: 41), “a 
considerable proportion of the European electorate has preferences on key 
European issues that are not represented by their respective parties, […] the 
positions of those voters who are skeptical or opposed to integration are almost 
totally ignored, […] voters and their representatives live in two different worlds”. 
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In this paper, we maintain that Europeanisation as negative integration does not 
necessarily coincide with a weaker position of the Left in political processes. As 
mentioned above, for reasons of clarity and simplicity, we assume here that left-
wing parties and trade unions basically share the same policy preferences in 
favour of stronger state intervention. In non-majoritarian polities where the 
agreement of more than one party is necessary to make political decisions, an 
agreement with left-wing parties and trade unions may become decisive to gather 
majorities in Parliament. In contradiction with the claims of the political economy 
literature, the domestic strength of the Left and its bargaining power can thus at 
least be preserved in Europeanised issues, and in addition domestic veto points 
can be used as weapons for opponents to Europeanisation. Figure 1 summarises 
the causal mechanisms discussed here. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Research design and case selection 
In the next section, an analysis of four recent decision-making processes in 
Switzerland provides insights as to the effect of (negative) European integration 
on the power of the social democratic Left and the reconfiguration of coalitions. 
Given the detailed analysis required to investigate decision-making processes, and 
more precisely the complex mechanisms of empowerment that lie within, we 
opted for a thorough scrutiny of a limited number of cases. Power is assessed in 
terms of policy influence, that is, the convergence between actors’ preferences and 
actual policy outputsiii. Comparing policy cases allows us to assess the influence of 
the Left in relative terms with respect to other actors involved in the policy 
process and with respect to cases for which the international dimension is missing. 
The case studies rely on the method of process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; 
Gerring and Thomas 2007), which allows researchers to highlight causal 
mechanisms in policy-making. Data is collected from a comprehensive body of 
documents (official reports, documents of interest groups, media) and 14 
interviews with actors involved in the decision-making processes, that were taped 
and transcribed. 
Switzerland is an interesting case - or even a “crucial case” - regarding the impact 
of negative European integration. On the one hand, although it is not member of 
the EU, it is strongly integrated economically in the European market (even more 
than some member states), and it adapts to European legislation regarding 
economic integration via bilateral agreements or so-called “autonomous 
adaptation” (Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarini 2002; Mach, Hausermann, and 
Papadopoulos 2003). The fact that Switzerland is not member of the EU allows on 
the other hand for some policy sectors to be isolated from EU influence, thereby 
allowing to control the variable “Europeanisation” to a greater extent than would 
have been the case in a EU member. For instance, whereas in member states social 
policies may be influenced by a whole set of European initiatives such as the 
European employment strategy and the conditions of the EMU, this does not apply 
to Switzerland. Hence, there is a greater difference between “Europeanised” and 
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“non-Europeanised” policies than in EU member states. Besides, Switzerland can 
also be considered a “crucial case” regarding the possible empowerment of social 
democrats and trade unions through Europeanisation. Traditionally, both have 
been weak in comparative terms. Employers have been much more influential than 
trade unionsiv and right-wing political parties have always enjoyed a majority in 
Parliamentv.  
Although it remains difficult to isolate the impact of Europeanisation, it is assumed 
that it will deploy its effects more strongly in policy domains that are subjected to 
the sphere of competence of the EU than in domains that remain more strictly in 
the domestic realm. Regarding the specific cases at hand, we first look into two 
Europeanised cases: one that is part of the bilateral agreements between 
Switzerland and the EU and one case of “autonomous adaptation” (i.e., horizontal 
or voluntary Europeanisation). Following Haverland (2006), we also studied two 
additional cases with no (or weak) domestic influence of the EU, namely cases in 
the domain of social policy in order to control for the impact of Europeanisation. 
All policies under scrutiny were considered important reforms. The two 
Europeanised cases were concluded by popular referendum that were in each case 
preceded by an intensive voting campaign; they were salient issues. Similarly, the 
two non-Europeanised cases dealt with major policy reforms in the context of 
welfare state retrenchment. Pension policies are probably the most important field 
of social policy, and affect a majority of the population, which makes them difficult 
to reform. Revisions of unemployment insurance may seem easier to achieve, as 
only a minority of the population. However, the recent reform in Switzerland was 
highly contested, and the Left succeeded in organising a referendum vote on the 
issue. Table 1 shows the degree of Europeanisation of policy processes as well as 
the final outcome of the reform. In the next section, we present the four cases and 
the role of the Left in each of them in greater detail. 
 
Table 1: Case selection: Europeanisation and variation in the strength of the 
Left 
Policy case 
Degree of 
Europeanisation 
Optional 
referendum and 
outcome 
Free movement of 
workers: enlargement 
(2003) 
strong:  
bilateral agreement 
Referendum (populist 
right)  
 bill accepted 
Electricity market 
liberalisation (2000/2002) 
strong: autonomous 
adaptation to European 
directive 
Referendum (Left)  
 bill rejected 
3rd Revision of 
unemployment insurance 
(2002) 
weak Referendum (Left) 
 bill accepted 
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Revision of occupational 
pension schemes (2003) 
weak No referendum 
 
Case Study Analysis 
Europeanised case 1: EU enlargement and free movement of workers 
In 2000, the Swiss government concluded a bilateral agreement on the free 
movement of workers with the EU-15 as part of a first package of bilateral 
agreements (Fischer et al. 2002). On the EU’s request, Switzerland agreed to open 
its labour market for EU workers and abolish its restrictive system based on yearly 
immigration quotas. As a condition for their support for the bilateral agreements, 
trade unions asked for “flanking measures” that were supposed to prevent risks of 
wage dumping given the important wage differentials between Switzerland and 
surrounding EU countries. Drawing upon its anti-immigration agenda, the 
national-populist Swiss People’s Party (SVP) opposed the agreement from the 
outset. Given the importance of bilateral agreements for the Swiss economy, the 
government and employers could not afford the risk of a referendum of the Left, 
which would join forces with the populist right against the free movement of 
workers. Consequently, trade unions obtained a package of measures to protect 
the labour market against wage dumping (Fischer et al. 2002). Despite a 
referendum launched by the populist right, the bilateral agreement on the free 
movement of workers entered into force in 2002, and transitory quotas were lifted 
in June 2004. 
EU enlargement imposed a renegotiation of this issue between the EU and 
Switzerland in order to extend free movement to the accession EU countries. On 
the domestic front, once again, unions asked for side-payments to guarantee their 
support to this extension. They considered that little had been provided for the 
implementation of the flanking measures in the framework of the first bilateral 
agreements and that the risks of wage dumping had become greater with the 
extension of free movement to countries whose wage levels were significantly 
lower than the EU-15 average (Interview FM3 ; Interview FM7). At the outset, the 
Government wanted to extend free movement to eastern countries without 
amending the existing regulatory apparatus (Interview FM2). At this point, unions 
actively used the media to put the issue of wage dumping on the agenda, thereby 
making their referendum threats credible (Interview FM7). From the outset, it was 
clear that the eurosceptic SVP would once again launch a referendum against the 
bilateral agreement. For employers and the government, it was therefore too risky 
to face the opposition of unions as well, especially given the fears within the 
population generated by immigration issues. At this point, the Government 
decided to set up a tripartite (employers, unions, state) working group to envisage 
the possibility of reinforcing the existing flanking measures following the 
procedure that had worked for the first flanking measures, despite a will by 
employers to make as few concessions as possible regarding labour market 
regulation (Interview FM2 ; Interview FM7). In the end, even though employers 
had declared themselves absolutely opposed to more stringent flanking measures, 
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they nevertheless agreed on measures to improve the implementation of labour 
market control.  
The Parliament changed very little to the agreement found with social partners 
despite the hostility of some segments of right-wing parties. The latter were, 
however, prompted by employers not to challenge the corporatist compromise. In 
the end, all parties except the Swiss People’s Party and fringe parties of the 
extreme-Right and Left supported the bill “for the sake of the Swiss economy” in 
the final vote (even one-third of the SVP supported it as well). At a general level, 
the parliamentary process was unusually quick due to the agenda imposed by the 
EU (Interview FM1). After its acceptance in Parliament, the Swiss Democrats, a 
small extreme-right party, launched a referendum supported by the SVP. The bill 
was approved on 25 September 2005 with a majority of 56% of citizens. As a 
whole, this can be considered as a case of successful corporatist policy-making 
with the Left obtaining significant concessions “in the shadow of the referendum”. 
The split amongst right-wing parties at the level of elites played a decisive role in 
the bargaining power of left-wing political forces, especially trade unions.  
 
Europeanised case 2: Electricity market liberalisation 
In 1994, while the Ministers in the European Union were still discussing the 
directive on electricity liberalisation in order to introduce competition in this 
hitherto state-controlled market (adopted in 1996), the Swiss Government decided 
to study the feasibility of electricity market liberalisation in Switzerland. Crucial 
aspects to decide upon were the access of all electricity suppliers to the high-
voltage network, which remains a (natural) monopoly, the organisation of this 
high-voltage network, the pace of the opening process, the handling of investments 
made in the context of a monopoly (so-called stranded investments), and social 
and ecological measures such as promoting renewable energies and guaranteeing 
supply security. 
Social democrats and trade unions, who at the outset were not opposed in 
principle to the idea of electricity market liberalisation, played only a minor role in 
the pre-parliamentary process. They were not part of the two working groups that 
discussed the reform and included representatives of the administration, 
employers, cantons, environmental and consumer associations and the electricity 
industry (Cattin 1995; Kiener 1997). And in the broad consultation of societal 
interests (the so-called statutory consultation procedure), the concerns of the Left 
(supply security, public service, public control and renewable energies) were 
largely ignored. While the Social democrats – at least the party elite – were 
nevertheless in favour of liberalisation, trade unions were more sceptical (BfE 
1998). Even though they were not opposed to liberalisation itself, they did not 
agree with the proposed project and asked for a more balanced bill which would 
take the social, ecological and economic consequences of liberalisation into 
account (SGB 1998). Eventually, the bill submitted to Parliament corresponded 
even more to the preferences of business, right-wing parties and the Government 
than did the one submitted to consultation: faster opening up and less measures 
regarding renewable energies (Conseil Fédéral 1999). The exclusion of the Left 
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from the pre-parliamentary process, where the core elements of reforms are 
usually decided, corresponds to the expectations on the effect of economic 
integration developed by the political economy literature. However it should also 
be said that, during this phase, the trade unions only devoted little attention to the 
project, considering it of minor importance. Opposition was not very vivid 
(Interview EL1 ; Interview EL2 ; VPOD 2002) 
In Parliament, the Left succeeded in introducing a few measures that support 
renewable energies. Yet other demands of the Left, in particular public ownership 
of the high-voltage electricity network, were rejected by the majority of right-wing 
parties. Despite the announcement of a referendum by some Left MPs close to the 
trade unions, the bill was accepted by a large majority, including a majority of the 
Social democrats. Soon after the vote in Parliament, however, trade unions 
launched a referendum against the law, and to the surprise of many, they 
succeeded in collecting the required number of signatures. During the referendum 
campaign, the majority within the Social democratic party shifted its views and 
decided to support the opponents of electricity liberalisation. Although a large 
coalition was in favour of market liberalisation, it was rejected in the popular vote 
in 2002. This unexpected result can be explained by an alliance between the 
majority of the Left that organised the referendum, together with the electorate of 
the conservative Swiss People’s Party and segments belonging to the small trade as 
well as the electricity sector. Particularly in the latter sector, scepticism against 
liberalisation became widespread, although the umbrella organisation was in 
favour of the law (Interview EL1; Interview EL3; Mahnig and Milic 2002). 
This case similarly demonstrates that institutional factors such as the referendum 
obviously are important, but they are not sufficient to explain the success of the 
Left against liberalisation of the electricity market. This time, the fragmentation 
within right-wing political forces was not between parties or organisations, but 
between the party elites and their basis. This provided an opportunity for an 
“objective” alliance between the Left which organised the referendum and 
conservative voters who did not follow the pro-liberal position of their 
organisation or political party. Therefore, we found that the part of the Left 
opposing liberalisation was able to prevent it by using veto points and by 
exploiting the convergence of views with the “losers of modernisation.” 
 
Control Case 1: Unemployment insurance policy 
Unemployment in Switzerland increased to unseen levels in the beginning in the 
1990s, whilst it had been a virtually unknown phenomenon in the past. This 
contributed to important problems of funding of the unemployment insurance 
scheme, whose contribution levels were set at very low levels, and the scheme 
soon faced important debts. In order to cope with this, payroll taxes were raised 
from 2 to 3% through an exceptional governmental bill passed through an 
accelerated procedure. The 1995 unemployment insurance revision prolonged the 
duration of benefits (up to 2 years) to cope with long-term unemployment while at 
the same time enhancing control mechanisms on the unemployed to ensure they 
were actively seeking work. A “solidarity contribution” was set up on high wages 
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to contribute to the long-term financing of the unemployment system. In spite of 
these measures, the insurance fund remained indebted, and the Federal 
Government had to invest public funds to ensure the sustainability of the system. 
With these provisional, emergency measures coming to an end, the Parliament 
drafted a motion prompted by right-wing parties in 1998 that commissioned the 
Federal Government to revise the law on unemployment insurance as part of a 
larger package designed to reduce state deficits. The mandate was to reduce 
payroll taxes from 3 to 2% and make the insurance scheme financially sustainable 
by itself without general tax money. In the meantime, unemployment decreased 
significantly (from 206’000 unemployed in 1997 to 65’000 at the beginning of 
2001). An expert committee comprising members of the federal administration, 
representatives of the cantons, employers and trade unions as well as academics 
was set up to advise the State Secretariat for Economics on a revision of 
unemployment insurance (Interview UI2 ; Interview UI3). Compromises were 
difficult to find, as the stringent financial mandate of the Parliament made cuts in 
expenditure necessary to ensure self-financing. Trade unions in particular could 
not agree on substantial retrenchment regarding allowances. 
The Federal Government came up with four major modifications believed to 
balance the project, although they did not enjoy the explicit support of unions and 
employers. First, payroll taxes were reduced from 3 to 2% of wages as demanded 
by right-wing parties and employers. Second, the “solidarity contribution” on high 
wages was maintained despite the opposition of employers, however with a lower 
contribution ratio. Third, the period of contribution required to claim 
unemployment was extended from 6 to 12 months, thereby making entitlement for 
benefits more restrictive. Finally, and this was considered the most important 
measure, the maximal duration of benefits was reduced from 520 to 400 days. 
These were essentially retrenchment measures, although the maintenance of the 
solidarity contribution on high wages was thought to balance the project at least to 
some extent (Conseil Fédéral 2001). 
Before the parliamentary phase began, both employer associations and trade 
unions strongly criticised the bill. Unions particularly denounced the reduction of 
the period during which the unemployed could receive benefits as well as the 
decrease of the solidarity contribution rate (Gaillard 2001). Employers criticised 
exactly the opposite – they agreed on the reduction of the length of benefits, but 
found it still too long, and they did not accept the maintenance of the solidarity 
contribution, which they perceived to be a sort of supplementary income tax 
(Hasler 2001).  
The right-wing parliamentary majority, and especially the Upper Chamber 
(Council of States) which is even more dominated by right-wing parties, agreed 
with employers’ demands and opposed the Government on the question of the 
solidarity contribution. In opposition to the will of the Government, the Council of 
States lifted it, though with the possibility to reintroduce it in periods of economic 
downturn; it accepted the shortening of the maximum duration of benefits and the 
increase in the contribution period (Interview UI4). The National Council (Lower 
Chamber) was somewhat closer to the position of the Government, but eventually 
rallied the Council of States on the most important measures, only introducing the 
 11 
possibility to prolong the period of benefit for cantons whose unemployment level 
is high (Interview UI1). Given the predominantly right-wing composition of 
Parliament, the bill was accepted in the National Council with a majority of 114 to 
58. The Swiss Federation of Trade Unions launched a referendum against the bill 
despite some internal opposition to this strategy. Swiss voters eventually accepted 
the revision  by a majority of 56.1% in 2002. In this “domestic” policy case, the Left 
was not able to count with any sort of support from segments of the “bourgeois” 
bloc, and remained isolated throughout the whole decision-making process. 
 
Control Case 2: Occupational pension policy 
The occupational pension scheme based on compulsory payroll taxes and managed 
by capitalisation was introduced in the Swiss constitution in 1972 as part of a 
”three-pillar system” combining public, occupational and private schemes. It was 
concretised by a law in 1982 establishing mandatory occupational pension 
schemes for employees whose income exceeds a certain ceiling. The law itself 
envisaged several further revisions over the following 15 years, and the 
elaboration of a first revision started immediately after its coming into force in 
1985. This was embedded within three contextual developments: changes in the 
labour market requesting a “recalibration” of the scheme (increases in 
participation rates by women, in flexible work, and in part-time work 
employment), the ageing of society, and an unfavourable economic context. 
A first reform proposal was elaborated in the standing extra-parliamentary 
committee on occupational pensions, which comprised representatives of the 
social partners, the federal administration, the cantons and pension funds. The Left 
was in favour of an extension of the scheme for employees with low incomes, and 
despite an increasing Left-Right polarisation in social policy, it was relatively 
successful. The report presented in 1994 included slightly improved provisions for 
low-income earners and part-time workers as well as the indexation of allowances 
to inflation (IDA FiSo 1996: 184; Conseil Fédéral 2000: 2648). Due to a difficult 
economic situation, however, the Government postponed the revision to the 
legislative period 1995-1999 (Année politique suisse 1998; Conseil Fédéral 2000: 
2647). In 1997, the responsible administrative unit elaborated a new proposal 
which largely ignored former propositions. When this new proposal was discussed 
in the standing committee, left-right polarisation had increased, and the 
preferences of the Left were outvoted by the majority of employers and pension 
funds representatives (or, if exceptionally accepted, ignored by the Government) 
(Interview OP1 ; Interview OP2). As a result and by contrast with the initial 
proposal of the commission, the new proposal focused mainly on financial 
consolidation and less on recalibration. 
Reactions to the proposal were divided into two camps. On the one hand, 
employers, right-wing parties, pension funds and the cantons were in favour of 
financial consolidation and against the extension to employees with lower incomes 
because of the increase in costs it would generate. On the other hand, social 
democrats, trade unions and women's organisations were sceptical about 
“consolidation” (perceived as retrenchment) and in favour of the expansion of 
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coverage to lower incomes and part-time workers, which concerns mainly women 
(DFI 1999). Finally, the bill submitted to Parliament only contained measures of 
consolidation and technical improvements, and no expansion was planned 
(Conseil Fédéral 2000: 2653). It therefore corresponded to the preferences of 
right-wing parties and employers, and was opposed by the left-wing parties and 
trade unions, who had been gradually marginalised. 
In Parliament, however, the debate about consolidation/retrenchment and 
“recalibration” was relaunched. In the parliamentary committee on Social Security 
and Health of the lower Chamber, a compromise was found and largely supported. 
On the one hand, it contained an expansion to low income and part-time earners, 
and on the other hand a decrease in the ratio between contributions and 
allowances (SGK-N 2002). Social democrats succeeded in reintroducing their main 
request thanks to a coalition with mainly female MPs from the Liberal Party 
(Hausermann 2006). After some final modifications in the plenary session (less 
far-reaching inclusion of low income earners), a large majority of MPs voted in 
favour of the law, and only the conservative Right and a minority of the Liberals 
continued to oppose it. As a whole, this case of “purely” domestic policy-making 
yielded more favourable outcomes for the Left than the previous one on 
unemployment policy. Interestingly, compromise was not achieved through the 
threat of the referendum, but only through ad hoc coalition-building in Parliament. 
This time, the Left did not coalesce with the “losers of modernisation,” but instead 
mainly with progressive MPs of right-wing parties. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing upon a focused comparison of the policy cases outlined above, we claim 
that the strength of the Left in Switzerland, namely left-wing parties and trade 
unions, did not prove to be significantly weaker in Europeanised cases than in 
control cases. The contrary can even be argued; it indeed proved to be most 
notable in the strongly Europeanised case of free movement of workers, in which 
trade unions were able to impose labour market regulations that would probably 
have been impossible to impose in a strictly national context given existing 
domestic power relationships. By contrast, it proved to be the weakest in the 
domestic case of unemployment insurance. In this latter case, the lack of balance 
between retrenchment and expansion measures did not undermine the acceptance 
of the bill despite the presence of multiple veto points, contradicting the findings of 
the literature on welfare state reform in Switzerland. As a matter of fact, it is 
usually argued that because retrenchment measures can be blocked by the Left in 
referendums, right-wing forces must agree with compromises favouring welfare 
state “modernisation” (Bonoli 1999).  
Hence, we were not able to confirm the causal inferences which suggest a 
weakening of the Left resulting from Europeanisation. In the two Europeanised 
cases, the Left proved to be rather strong, albeit in a somewhat different manner 
(power of initiative vs. blocking power): it was strongly integrated in the decision-
making process in the case of free movement and was marginalised but won the 
referendum in the case of electricity market liberalisation (see table 1). For control 
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cases, no systematic pattern can be observed, the Left being able to obtain 
concessions in the case of occupational pensions in a way typical of a consensus 
democracy but not in the case of unemployment insurance, where we observed a 
more majoritarian pattern. The following table summarises our results. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Following the theoretical argument outlined above, one can observe a similar 
mechanism in both Europeanised cases as to the determinants of the strength of 
left-wing parties and trade unions in a context of Europeanisation, namely the split 
between potential losers and winners of internationalisation. In the case of 
electricity market liberalisation, the Left was able to mobilise an important 
proportion of potential “losers” of liberalisation processes (employees of small 
businesses and residents of peripheral regions) in the referendum phase despite a 
relative marginalisation in the decision-making process. Interestingly enough, 
these groups are the core constituencies of the Swiss People’s Party, whose elite 
supported liberalisation. However, the successful use of domestic veto points by 
the Left took place at the end of the process and was essentially translated into a 
blocking power. In the case of free movement of workers, we observed an “unholy 
alliance” between trade unions and the populist right, as both threatened not to 
support extension. A crucial point here is the division within the bourgeois camp 
between the liberal right and employers on one side and the populist right on the 
other side. Trade unions in particular used this divide to obtain side-payments, 
which would have probably been impossible to obtain from Government and 
employers outside the context of Europeanisation. Hence, the internal divisions of 
the Right was a common point of both policy issues which contributed to empower 
the Left, be it between elites and the electorate in the case of electricity market, or 
between the populist and the liberal right in the case of free movement of workers. 
In both issues, the new cleavage linked to internationalisation  was of crucial 
importance, although it took different forms and manifested itself politically in 
different arenas – in the pre-parliamentary or corporatist arena in the case of free 
movement, and in the referendum arena in the case of electricity liberalisation.  
In the domestic control cases by contrast, no such opposition could be observed, 
the lines of conflict following essentially the traditional Left-Right divide. In this 
kind of configuration, the Left enjoys a much weaker position because of its 
minority position in Parliament. This was particularly the case for unemployment 
insurance reform, where the preferences of liberal right-wing parties, employers 
and the populist right were aligned on retrenchment measures. Therefore, in the 
Swiss case at least, Europeanisation has not weakened the Left, but rather 
reinforced it by dividing the right camp along a winner/loser cleavage. In other 
words, the reconfiguration of cleavages resulting from Europeanisation has 
increased the policy influence of the Left. This is a counterintuitive result when 
compared with political economy interpretations. The causal mechanism identified 
in this article is a joint effect of coalition-building and the use of veto points. Each 
of them is a necessary condition for the empowerment, and both operating jointly 
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seem sufficient for it. Such factors are not given due attention by the political 
economy literature. 
Generalisations based on the results presented here are of course subject to a set 
of limitations. On the one hand, cross-class coalitions can be built in all countries 
affected by internationalisation or European integration. It may be argued that the 
new structural cleavage between winners and losers triggered by globalisation and 
Europeanisation affects all national political systems (see Kriesi et al. 2006). In the 
absence of the referendum device however – which is the rule in the vast majority 
of EU-member states -, it may be harder to build coalitions with parts of the Right 
in the pre-parliamentary or the parliamentary arena (such coalitions are built in 
the “shadow” of the referendum), since direct democracy provides additional 
channels for contestation of European integration (as shown by a few recent 
referendums held in France, the Netherlands and Ireland). Further, Switzerland’s 
non-membership in the EU makes its margin of manoeuvre greater as to 
adaptation to EU policies. Strategies of non-adaptation may be possible in 
Switzerland and not in member states, where EU influence is more constraining. In 
combination with strong veto points such as the referendum, the strengthening of 
the Left might thus be more likely in Switzerland (where by the way the Left is 
traditionally weak) than elsewhere. Notwithstanding these qualifications, this 
article shows that European economic integration can affect the domestic power 
balance in a counterintuitive way. Such mechanisms should be given greater 
consideration in the Europeanisation literature in order to better understand the 
consequences of European integration for nation-states. 
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Figure 1: Causal Schema 
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Table 2: Summary of Case Study Analysis 
 Pre-parliamentary phase Parliamentary phase Referendum phase 
 Commissions Consultation 
procedure 
  
Europeanised 1: 
Free movement of 
workers: 
enlargement 
(2003) 
Unions closely 
involved, 
compromise 
reached. 
Few modifications. Slight reinforcement of 
labour market 
protection through 
alliance with small 
businesses. 
Left support for acceptance 
along with market-liberal 
Right and employers. 
Europeanised II: 
Electricity market 
liberalisation 
(2000/2002) 
Left almost 
completely excluded. 
Significant 
modifications, against 
preferences of the Left. 
Some limited 
amendments (alliance 
with mountain cantons). 
Left divided, but success of 
trade unions and part of 
partisan Left, in alliance 
with conservative voters. 
Control Case I: 
Revision of 
unemployment 
insurance 
(2000/2002) 
Trade unions 
involved, but no 
compromise reached 
with employers. 
Government stuck to 
main measures of 
project elaborated by 
the administration.  
Right-wing majority 
imposed retrenchment 
measures, opposition by 
the Left. 
Referendum launched by 
trade unions and supported 
by the Left, but defeated in 
the vote. 
Control case II: 
Revision of 
occupational 
pension schemes 
(2003) 
Left present in 
specific commission, 
compromise, but 
ignored by the 
Government. 
Crucial modification: 
only measures of 
‘consolidation’ 
remained, measures of 
expansion were 
deleted. 
Compromise between 
the Left and liberal MPs: 
partial extension to 
lower incomes. 
No referendum (law 
considered as more or less 
balanced). 
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Notes 
                                                     
i  See for instance Schmidt (2006), although she focuses on the impact of integration on 
state-society or center-periphery relations, and not really on relations between 
domestic social forces. 
ii In this article, we use “social democratic forces” and “the Left” interchangeably.  
iii Therefore, we do not deal with strength in terms of electoral power. 
iv For instance Switzerland is considered as an exemplar case of « liberal » (as opposed 
to « social ») corporatism in Katzenstein’s seminal work on small states (Katzenstein 
1985). 
v On the other hand, it may be argued that minorities are given enhanced power with 
the right to launch a referendum against bills passed in Parliament (50’000 signatures 
are required), and that this is a powerful countercheck to majority power. However, 
traditionally this resource has not been of much help for the Left: a study of 
referendums in which the Social-democratic party opposed legislative bills approved 
by Right-wing majorities between 1970 and 1987 showed that opposition was 
successful in only two out of ten popular votes (Papadopoulos 1994: 137). 
